Which Battleships Sunk In Pearl Harbor Were Returned To Service?

;

The Myth That "Viii Battleships Were Sunk" At Pearl Harbor

Historians/History

Mr. Neumann is a professor at the Hofstra Academy School of Law.

Every yr as Dec 7 approaches we hear and read that eight battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor. That is fifty-fifty repeated in a 2001 article by HNN staff on the HNN website debunking movie myths about Pearl Harbor.

It didn't happen.

Eight battleships were there. Two were "lost in activeness," the Navy's term for damage that permanently destroys a ship'southward usefulness. None were "sunk," which means disappearing below the ocean surface (the most obvious but non the just way to go lost in activity). Pearl Harbor is shallow, with only a few feet of water separating the battleship'due south bottoms from the harbor bottom. No uppercase ship could disappear below the waves in a shallow harbor.

Hither is what happened to each of the eight battleships during and after the attack: Pennsylvania was in dry dock when the attack began and suffered only superficial impairment acquired when a destroyer in the aforementioned dry dock exploded. (Sinking a capital send in dry out dock is physically impossible, even if the dry dock is flooded.) Maryland was also lightly damaged. Both ships were seaworthy later that month. Tennessee suffered more than damage, but was seaworthy early in 1942. California and West Virginia were torpedoed and settled onto the bottom of the harbor, their master decks well above water. If they had suffered the same impairment at sea, they would have been sunk, just the shallowness of the harbor saved them — illustrating the foolishness of attacking ships in port. Both were repaired, with many improvements, and went to ocean again. Nevada was the simply battleship in move during the attack. Her crew ran her ashore to prevent sinking. Oklahoma capsized, and the forrad mag of Arizona exploded. These are the two battleships that actually were lost in action. Visitors to the Arizona memorial see cypher above water, merely that is because the Navy removed the ship's superstructures, guns and turrets, which would otherwise exist mostly to a higher place water today.

The half dozen surviving battleships fought in decisive battles later on in the war. On D-Day, Nevada shelled German emplacements backside the Normandy beaches, with devastating effect. The other v survivors shelled many Japanese-held Pacific islands before the Marines and Army landed on the beaches. When the U.S. invaded the Philippines, the Japanese sent three naval forces to ambush American troop ships. One of them, with two Japanese battleships, came upward the Surigao Strait, where West Virginia , Tennessee, California, Maryland, and Pennsylvania (all allegedly had been "sunk" three years before at Pearl Harbor) were on shore-shelling duty, together with Mississippi. Later U.S. destroyers sank one of the Japanese battleships with torpedoes, the U.Southward. battleships sank the other one with gunfire. This was merely time in history that U.S. battleships always crossed an enemy'due south "T" — the maneuver for which battleships were originally designed and built. And information technology was the final time that any battleships of any navy fired on each other in battle.

Despite initial appearances, the assault on Pearl Harbor was an abject strategic failure. The Japanese attacked a fleet in port, where it is hard to crusade permanent loss of a upper-case letter transport and where repair facilities are already nearby. They attacked obsolete ships and in so doing taught the U.South. Navy from the very outset to rely on shipping carriers rather than battleships. The Japanese attacked without any guarantee that the most valuable U.S. ships — the carriers — would be present, and all the U.S. carriers were safely elsewhere on December 7. At Midway half-dozen months afterward, those aforementioned American carriers sank 2-thirds of the Japanese carrier fleet, inflicting a wound from which the Japanese navy never recovered. And the Japanese ignored the unglamorous target that truly would take bedridden the U.S. Navy for maybe a twelvemonth or more than: the oil tanks next to Pearl Harbor. Without the ability to refuel at Pearl, the U.S. Navy would accept had to retreat to San Diego, San Francisco Bay, and Puget Audio.

Related Links

3 Top Movie Myths Near Pearl Harbor

comments powered past

More Comments:

Richard Neumann - 2/6/2007

Information technology's on the other side of Ford'south Isle, not next to Arizona. In 1931, Utah ceased to be a battleship. The guns were removed, and it was converted into a radio-controlled target send. After the conversion, Utah did have a small coiffure, despite the radio-controlled feature. Its primary function after 1931 was to get shot at during target practice. Its hull number on Dec. 7 was AG-16, having lost the BB-31 designation in 1931.

Whitney Sprague - 1/28/2007

You know, that rather large lump in the water adjacent to the Arizona?

Geoffrey I. Palikar - 12/21/2006

Professor - you are still 'wiggling' every bit fast every bit y'all can - but it won't aid because y'all can't retract your sensationalistic , snake oil use of the give-and-take "sunk". You have taken things out of context to "wiggle" your style out of a very poorly written commodity - who apparent motive was
sensationalism. Ships were indeed "sunk" at Pearl Harbor - and in that location is NO - repeat NO offical
United states of america Naval history that purports differently.

And while yous may claim that Samuel Elliot was the premier American nautical historian working during the 20th century - he didn't piece of work with an interdiciplinary approach, which more than likely skewed his arroyo to things as they were happening. So much of military machine history is existence intensely reviewed precisely because the armed services historians of the day didn't use an interdiciplinary approach. And there are and so many armed forces historians who even so myopically refuse an interdiciplinary approach. In fact, keeping the superiority of an interdiciplinary
approach in mind - I can't call up of a worse affair to do than attempt to write history while its happening - you lot can't all get the various input that you lot need for a comprehensive view.

Your 'ruddy herring' answer that the Japanese excelled at torpedo bombing and at nighttime surface fighting - has nothing to do with your original article. Moreover, the notion that the Japanese excelled at torpedo bombing - is a highly realtive issue based upon U.s. technological issues with our torpedo designs - an issue that had not to do with the torpedo bombing skills of our US submariners. Had the R& D community actually listened to U.s.a. submarine commanders sooner - our United states torpedo bombing would have been just as effective and noteworthy as the Japanese - and we eventually outmatched the Japanese torpedo bombing skills once we fixed
our WW2 torpedo designs.

Since you bring upwardly the bailiwick of Japanese torpedo bombing - the merits that attacking Pearl Harbor was an apple-polishing strategic failure is some other superficial hindsight stance. Using an interdiciplinary approach, we now know that had the WW2 version of Bushido non clouded the minds of the Japanese so severely - the Japanese would have taken a much more aggressive stance of attacking ALL US supply/logistical ships likewise as Us majuscule ships right off the West Coast. The fact that the Japanese WW2 version of Bushido would not allow them to torpedo United states supply ships played a major function in allowing the U.s.a. to regain a solid toehold in the
Pacific. (Run into comments about the Forgotten War/Aleutian Islands below.)

Information technology was a total confluence of higly circuitous events that created an abject strategic failure on the part of the Japanese in WW2. The japanese strategic failure only isn't a simple black & white film equally y'all present. {And we oasis't even mentioned the pure luck of the draw at Midway, et al.}

The point, professor, is that the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor was not an apple-polishing strategic failure from the gitgo - nor was it destined to be an abject failure. The Japanese assail of Pearl Harbor was simply ane of many elements in a highly circuitous confluence of events that became inexorably intertwined and turned the WW2 Japanese state of war programme/actions into an abject strategic failure. We were non destined to win WW2 - we were lucky to have had the better military minds at the time. War is unpredictable - and there are innumerable issues where the luck of the draw could have gone against usa in WW2.

The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor turned out to be "part" of an abject strategic error from the long view of history - merely it wasn't a strategic mistake at the time it
took place - information technology was a simple imperfect raid that bought the Japanese strategic fourth dimension merely equally they idea it would - considering they 'sunk' a majority of the Pacific fleet in 1 cruel swoop - and
created a strategic fourth dimension gap. In the Japanese minds, that strategic time gap was going to allow them to conquer the Pacific and plase the US in a position to sue for peace. "IF" the Japanese hadn't blinded themselves with such a dysfunctional culture of warfare - they simply
might have given every bit much worse run for our money that what they did.

Equally far as our 'obsolete' ships in port - isn't information technology funny how we didn't call them 'obsolete' when Pearl Habor was attacked. They were the but capital ships we had at the time in the Pacific - and there is cypher to propose that nosotros would non have upgraded and/used them against the Japanese in the Phillipines. Additionally - militaries have been using 'obsolete' equipment for milleniniums with excellent results. Moreover, ascertain "obsolete'. Its not the 'obsoleteness' of the equipment - its how you use the equipment that matters. War machine thinking becomes obsolete long before equipment does. Then the result of 'obsolete' is another highly realtive term than we bandy near indiscriminately as another crimson herring when we don't really know what we are talking about.

May I remind yous that information technology was the 'obsolete' Fairey Swordfish
Mk II torpedo bomber (a simple slow-become 'obsolete' bi-plane) that damaged the Bismark'southward rudder - which in turn led to the Bismark'due south demise. In other words, information technology was an 'obsolete' slice of equipment that immune a confluence of critical events to occur.

May I remind you that it was mainly 'obsolete' naval and footing equipment that won back the Aleutian Islands in the Forgotten State of war. Although the U.s. complained vociferously about the High german submarines sinking our merchant marine ships in the Atlantic - just we turned effectually and did exactly what the Japanese would not do - we agressively torpedoed Japanese supply ships. In the Forgotten war of the Aleutian Islands, Rear Admiral Charles McMorris routinely interdicted Japanese supply convoys. Information technology was merely "after" the Battle of the Komandorski Islands, that the Nippon abandoned attempts to resupply their Aleutian garrisons by the surface and resorted to submarine resupply instead. And a shut srcutiny of the recapture of US Aleutian Islands will reveal that we won that encounter using field expedient methods and a variety of 'obsolete' equipment.

BTW - United states submarines then went on and routinely interdicted ('sunk') Japanese supply ships in droves for the rest of the war. If any part of WW2 history is highly disregarded - the The states -v- Japanese Pacific submarine doctrines are rarely discussed. Now there was an abject strategic Japanese failure!

And BTW - while WW2 was really the ascendancy of the aircraft carrier - there were enough of naval battles that relied upon concerted action with other standard capital ships - and aircraft carrier is rather naked without capital letter ships surrounding information technology in armada formation.

Then delight finish 'wiggling' about with the blood-red herring problems of capital ships at Pearl Harbor being 'obsolete' and not 'sunk'. Professor, face it, you wrote a very poor superficial article at best.

Richard Neumann - 12/14/2006

The 15-volume official Navy history of World War 2 was written by Samuel Elliot Morison, the premier American nautical historian working during the 20th century. By presidential directive, Morison was deputed a rear admiral in 1942 so that he could research and observe this history while information technology was happening and have the widest and deepest possible access to people, places, and documents. Separately, in two other books, The Ii-Ocean War and Strategy and Compromise, Morison explained what he had adamant to be the bigger picture of the naval war. Considering of Morison's extraordinary skill as an historian, his unparalleled access to top commanders, and his agreement of life at ocean (he really followed Columbus's Caribbean area routes under sheet so that he could encounter and feel what the sailors on Columbus's decks saw and felt), these books are, amidst other historians, accorded much respect.

Morison considered the Pearl Harbor attack to have been a strategic fault past the Japanese. Really, the words he used were "stupid and suicidal." (The Two-Ocean War, p.seventy) "It was a hit-and-run raid, and the hit was not decisive." (The Two-Ocean State of war, p.77)
"Our 3 aircraft carriers were safety; the repair shops, which did an amazingly quick chore on damaged ships, were virtually untouched, as was the fuel-oil tank subcontract, filled to capacity, whose loss would have tied up the fleet for months." (The Two-Body of water War, p.68) "The Japanese high command, by their idiotic act, had made a strategic nowadays of the offset guild to the United States; they had united the land . . . ." (The Two-Ocean War, p.69) At best, "the Pearl Harbor set on was only a qualified tactical success because no aircraft carrier was sunk, and the installations and fuel tanks at Pearl Harbor were hardly touched. And from a strategic indicate of view, the thing was idiotic. For if Japan had attacked only British and Dutch possessions, the American Congress might well have refused to declare war; and if Japan had attacked the Philippines" and not Pearl, "the Battle Armada (co-ordinate to the Rainbow-5 plan) would have gone lumbering beyond the Pacific, very likely to be sunk in deep water by Japanese bombers based on the Marshall islands." (Strategy & Compromise, pp. 67-68)

My period of specialty is 1890-1954, and the heart of that period is the two interwar decades. It is difficult to understand the international beliefs of the United States, United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland, and Nihon during that time without detailed cognition of the 15 interwar battleships — their batteries, weight of broadside, speed, cruising and shooting ranges, deportation, etc., in comparing with the upper-case letter ships of other navies. National leaders were as aware of these details as electric current leaders are now of things similar nuclear missile capacities. The U.S. had an army equal to that of a small-scale European state together with a tiny army air corps. Because an assaulter would accept had to cantankerous an ocean to get to united states, information technology was assumed that these ships were our national defense. All that was no longer true past 1941, merely it is hard to understand the flow without knowing these ships.

They would — every bit Morison recognized — have been helpless going to the aid of the Philippines. They were the slowest capital ships on the ocean, and had to exist because our navy was required to have what naval officers of the time called "long legs," the ability to travel smashing distances without refueling. They also had virtually completely ineffective antiaircraft capacities, without Bofors guns, twin-mount v-inchers, or constructive fire control. (These capacities were generally added later.) U.S. antiaircraft burn down at sea was so inadequate generally that at Midway one of the cruisers trying to protect Yorktown was reduced to firing its primary battery into the body of water before approaching torpedo planes, hoping to down them with splashes. The Japanese excelled at torpedo bombing and at night surface fighting. A person with amore for the memory of these ships cringes at what would have happened to them if they had been attacked at sea rather than at Pearl. Retrieve of day torpedoing similar what happened to the British off Malaya and night battles similar Savo Island — with far greater loss of ships and life than what did happen at Pearl.

When you lot read something with which you disagree, the appropriate response is not scorn and ridicule. The appropriate response is to enquire the other person why they believe the matter with which yous disagree. The reply is oftentimes reasonable, even if you nonetheless disagree. Here, the answer is that every idea in the original article except i is part of the accepted discourse among historians specializing in this menstruum.

The exception is my signal that the give-and-take "sunk" in this context confuses the public. And the first person to post in response proved my bespeak with his lexicon quotation about the battleship taking two hours to sink. Afterwards two hours, what would you wait to see where the ship had been? Near people would say empty water, except perhaps for lifeboats. Exploding does not take ii hours, just going down like Titanic might. The word evokes an epitome that is not consistent with what happened at Pearl.

Mr Palikar in particular might want to read HNN's rules governing discussion boards. The link appears with the annotate menu. Proper name calling and other forms of ad hominem attack are not permitted on this website. Nor are they adequate in nigh other places.

Geoffrey I. Palikar - 12/10/2006

The "professor's" common definition of "sunk" is all wrong - no matter how much he attempts to nuance the issue. Its pure demogogic sensationalistic serpent oil - nothing more. And now that several folks have chosen his cards on the definition of 'sunk' - the "professor" wants to wiggle around and claim the the term"sunk" is too fuzzy/elastic. Jerk all you desire "professor" - serpent oil by any other name is still ophidian oil.

And IF the "professor" attempts to wiggle more by improper use of a nuanced definition in maritime law regarding whatever legal term for "sunk" - this but doesn't use to strategic

military machine matters.

The "professor's" concept of 'Foolishness to set on a transport in Harbor' - is also wholly without

merit - and reveals his full armed services incompetence.

>>>The "professor" is totally out of "time context" - Pearl Harbor attack took place in 1941 -

non 2001. The "professor" utterly fails to understand the country of the fine art of war in a WW2

context. (And its conspicuously a military subject that is way too complex and detailed for the "professor" to grasp.)

>>>The "professor" shows no understanding for the concept and necessity of "strategic fourth dimension"

with respect to overall strategic, operational and tactical issues. The IJN significantly delayed all US naval 2nd strike adequacy throughout the entire Pacific. The IJN ready the US back significantly with regards to the most irreplaceable strategic chemical element of "Time"- which all the IJN intended to practice. And 'fourth dimension', my dear "professor" is the nearly irreplaceable strategic chemical element of state of war - there is but never enough time in war.

>>> The "professor" shows no understanding that the IJN achieved a major fait accompli and this single air-raid sinking 8 US ships in port is exactly what allowed the IJN to initially conquer the vast bulk of the Pacific - and garner its resources to feed the IJN war machine - which is exactly what the IJN intended to do.

>>>The "professor" shows no agreement of 'armed services dominoes'. The IJN accomplished a major "air raid" in minimal fourth dimension with massive enemy harm - with insignificant IJN losses - and significantly disrupted the element of strategic fourth dimension delaying any immediate United states of america military response. Ergo - Bataan and Corregidor never had a fighting hazard to hold out - there were NO United states of america strategic naval reserves to send. The IJN accomplished their intended mission at Pearl Harbor - the IJN "sunk" viii US ships in port. And, hence, the rest of the Pacific rim was a cakewalk for the IJN.

Sun Tzu (circa 500BC) said that 'All war is deception' - and if the professor would bother to read up on the basics of war - he would find that charade is a highly prehistoric holdover of 'archaic' warfare {from Homo Erectus and our primate cousins}. The masterful IJN deception of an air-raid in the middle of the Pacific Ocean simply "sinking" 8 United states of america ships in port >> played a major role in throwing the US totally off strategic residuum. Ergo, the established Us state of war plans for the Pacific had to exist totally scuttled - the US had to starting time from strategic scratch because the IJN had already stolen the initiative and the momentum.

BTW - With respect to whatsoever comments regarding issue of any improve 'logistical' targets that the IJN supposedly missed at Pearl Habor - such comments reveal complete ignorance regarding the

IJN-WW2 civilization of 'bushido'. (Another subject that is conspicuously besides circuitous for the "professor"

to grasp.)

The United states won dorsum the Pacific from the IJN at nifty human sacrifice to the US over a period of very bloody years. What the 'professor' doesn't seem to grasp is that the US defeated the IJN with more than a fair share of sheer luck for the US. Many WW2 naval battles could have gone either way. In order for the The states to regain the Pacific inititative and momentum, it was NO cakewalk for those who fought and died in the Pacific. Oh yeah...and it all started with a naval air-raid in the centre of the Pacific Ocean that "sunk" viii US ships in port, which allowed the IJN to steal the inititative and momentum and the etire Pacific rim.

Once walks abroad from the "professor's" article asking oneself: Would YOU desire the "professor" in charge of military strategy for the current Irak war? Hmmmmmmmm...no, I'd actually rather bargain with the highly flawed thinking of Rumsfeld earlier the massively flawed thinking of the "professor".

Benj. Due west. Homestead - 12/ix/2006

Agreed, Mr. Berkowitz. From a purely intellectual or operational standpoint, "sunk" isn't terribly a terribly useful at this bespeak in time, and consequently, a word at this point in time of whether or non the battleships were "Sunk" is irrelevant.

Would you concede, yet, that the term had a deeper emotional impact than would "lost in action" or "mission kill" on the average US citizen who, prior to the attack, had been so reluctant to become involved in the crisis in Europe? I further posit that in 1941 a headline of "US Operational Readiness Obliterated past Japanese" lacks the panache and sensationalism also.

At THAT time, a discussion of whether the ships were "sunk" may have been slightly more interesting in academic circles but equally irrelevant to the public at big.

Benj. W. Homestead - 12/ix/2006

Dr. Neumann, it would announced that yous're using a quasi-sensational headline effectually the ceremony of Pearl Harbor to over emphasize a relatively minor technical point.

Nothing in your article or your follow supports the notion that attacking ships in port was in anyway foolish. I take umbrage to both that bald cess and your qualification in the follow-up, equally each wrongly discredits the truthful value of the set on: exploiting a weakness of the US; destroying the operational readiness of all eight ships, the port and the forces stationed on the base of operations; and assuasive time to seize control of direction of the war in the Pacific.

Though I hate to quote Sun Tzu, equally he tends to be overused as some ultimate authority on "all things war", it nevertheless seems oddly and straight appropriate here: "Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, brand your fashion by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots." This is nearly a verbatim description of what the IJN did at Pearl Harbor. Precisely in what fashion is that FOOLISH?

The attacks disrupted momentum of the U.s. forces. The Usa lost time in launching a counter attack. This gave the IJN fourth dimension to found a foothold in the Philippines and the remainder of the Pacific rim with virtually no resistance, making MacArthur's subsequent defeats possible and making the massive bloodshed of Us troops all but inevitable.

Essentially your article appears to quibble over the use of the term "sunk". Regardless of whether the attack on Pearl Harbor resulted in whatever semblance to that unremarkably defined term that y'all appear to be coopting information technology for utilise as a "term of fine art", your analysis would lead some to believe that the attack was somehow not significant to either the soldiers, sailors and civilians who died OR to the operational capacity of Usa forces.

Permit's exit aside the quality that "eight Battleships SUNK by Japan" would have to rally the emotions of the average Joe Citizen in Waukeegan. Permit'south get out aside the question of whether all eight ships were "lost in activeness"... clearly non all eight were.

If you frame the discussion in terms of whether "the Japanese navy deserve[southward] credit for destroying one-half the U.S. battleships", information technology's a no-brainer! They didn't. Simply let's get out that debunking to the folks who enquiry urban legends. Ships are tools in war, goose egg more than. The IJN did much worse than completely destroy some tools, as the fable of Pearl Harbor would have us believe, they took reward of one of our weaknesses and in doing so restructured the terms of the military "discussion" that ensued. I get the distinct impression that your article is based on a premise similar to a chess historian correcting a argument like "Kasparov took Karpov's queen" when in fact Kasparov forced Karpov to give up his queen.

If you leave semantics out of the give-and-take, the fact remains that half the United states battleships were destroyed OR incapacitated, directly forcing the strategic decisions of FDR to regroup and focus on the European front first. Time proverbially is money in business organisation, but in war, time is measured in blood and lives lost. The affect on US force readiness was firsthand, it was long lasting, and it was nothing but masterful stroke of strategy behalf of the IJN. The subsequent battles in the Pacific were then intractable and bloody that the US ultimately resorted to direct theretofore-unimaginable attacks on the citizens of Japan.

Let's not forget that subsequent to Pearl Harbor was the Boxing of Attu, the first state of war on American soil since the State of war of 1812. The Japanese took control of American soil. The Japanese interred its inhabitants, nearly one-half of whom died of disease and starvation IN Japan. Professor, do y'all seriously believe that any of that would have been possible had the US not been crippled and rather had been ready to respond to the Pearl Harbor attack?

Sunk, damaged or delayed, it was a brilliant and deadly attack, regardless of whether yous or Admiral Yamamoto recognized information technology or non. Choice bones with feasibility of the notion of "hakko ichiu" at the cadre of the Japanese vision. Dissect the lack of clarity of vision of the Japanese to take marginally different steps than the ones they chose and straight attack the US's undefended ports and harbors off the California coast.

Still, permit's non play games with language or try to reinvent history. Nihon came dangerously shut to winning WWII confronting the Us before the state of war fifty-fifty started.

A few wayward subs off of California, deployment of a few troops here and a few ships there, and yous would have had mayhem in a Los Angeles and San Francisco largely unprotected by the Usa armada. That would accept forced FDR to put troops and resource on the ground IN the United states of america rather than in Europe, and the issue of WWII would accept been very different.

You point out the facts very well insomuch as you lot describe the damage to each ship (though I note that you do little to business relationship for the significant loss due to the damage to the port itself); however, your analysis is ultimately irrelevant. Were the ships truly SUNK? Who cares? The harm was done.

Now, should y'all intendance to focus on the lack of follow-through by the IJN and characterize that equally FOOLISH. I would take no qualms.

Richard Neumann - 12/9/2006

When the public hears or reads in the media that "eight battleships were sunk at Pearl Harbor," it understands that to mean that eight battleships were destroyed there — which simply is not true. The sloppy apply of the word "sunk" combined with ignorance of the facts nearly near of the ships appear to be the causes of the misunderstanding. For precision and clarity, during the state of war the Navy used the term "lost in action" to refer to ships that suffered damage rendering them useless. The Navy did non lose eight battleships in activity at Pearl Harbor, and it does not deserve blame for having done so. Nor does the Japanese navy deserve credit for destroying half the U.Southward. battleships in committee at the time (a total of sixteen later the commitment of Due north Carolina). The Japanese attack was bold, clever, and skilled in technique, but it was non the brilliant strategic masterstroke the public assumes it to accept been. (Morison criticized the Japanese set on, for reasons similar to the ones I mentioned in the article.) I agree with the posted comments that the survival of the repair facilities was of enormous benefit, that they would have been difficult for the Japanese to destroy, and that the 72-60 minutes turnaround of Yorktown in the Pearl repair one thousand was essential to the outcome at Midway. Correction of ane inaccuracy in the article: I had forgotten that today the top of the barbette that once supported Arizona's number 3 turret does protrude above the water.

Geoffrey I. Palikar - 12/eight/2006

Now just which military war higher did "Professor" Neumann nourish - the School of Imperial Hubris ??
"Professor" Neumann's military accumen...Own'T - it's actually more than an incompetent attempt at shamanism than bona fide 'military' history. For those of usa who are actually bona fide armed services professionals (w/28+ years agile duty and a personal library of m+ volumes on war machine bailiwick), I have never read such poorly researched historical blathering before. In fact "Professor" Neumann's total misapplication of the facts doesn't pass the 2LT exam! "Professor" Richard G. Neumann Jr. should refrain from publishing his lamentable distorted hallucinations - much less purporting them as credible 'armed services' reading fabric. And "SHAME" on HNN for assuasive "Professor" Neumann to publish such poorly researched garbage - an utter sham from a shaman of history.

Robert Murphy - 12/7/2006

Cheers very much for some illuminating feedback, Mr. Berkowitz.

Robert

Howard C Berkowitz - 12/6/2006

You make valid points. Admiral Nagumo, commanding the Japanese Mobile Fleet, was not especially imaginative. With hindsight, a third strike probably was justified.

Even more disquisitional than the oil were the major repair facilities (e.yard., drydocks) and the submarine base of operations. Remember, the consensus of the postwar debriefings of surviving Japanese commanders were that submarine operations were one of the iii things that crush them, the others existence island-hopping and fast carrier operations/the seatrain.

Again confounding the argument is whether they had advisable weapons to take out major repair, base of operations facilities, and oil tanks. We often forget the inaccuracy and express outcome 1941 ordnance. The Japanese did develop state-of-the-art weapons to striking warships, but their bombs would have been of dubious event against drydocks -- that took something like the 1944-1945 "convulsion" bombs designed by Barnes Wallis. Against the oil farm, they'd need both blast and incendiary munitions.

Howard C Berkowitz - 12/half-dozen/2006

"Sunk" isn't terribly useful terminology, compared to "mission kill" and "platform impale". USS Arizona was more than mission killed; when the ship breaks apart and the pieces residuum on the bottom, that ship is as expressionless every bit HMS Hood, which was in more pieces in deeper water.

Robert Potato - 12/5/2006

If I may most humbly say, truly a fine commodity Professor Neumann. I really enjoyed it.

I do have a question for you, however, regarding the Japanese failure to strike the US Navy'southward fuel stores at Pearl Harbor. Please right me if I am wrong, but I believe that the IJN left largely intact an even more vital strategic target, and that was the harbor'southward repair and maintenance facilities. Had the shipyard been destroyed, then surely the raising and restoration of those half-dozen battleships would have been delayed for months. Far more significantly, damaged The states aircraft carriers would take had to sail all the way to the Due west Coast for repairs--the Yorktown, need I add, would certainly have had to sit down out Midway.

Then again, at the risk of sounding diffident, perhaps I am missing other factors hither. Mayhap the shipyard would non accept been such an easy target; if I am not incorrect, the USAAF found during its strategic bombing campaign that industrial targets are non easily destroyed. Certainly the oil tanks would exist a far softer target.

Thank you,

Robert

Joseph Francis - 12/4/2006

SUNK, noun, "to readapt PART of the volume of a supporting substance or object and become TOTALLY OR PARTIALLY submerged or enveloped; fall or descend into or below the surface or to the bottom (ofttimes fol. past in or into): The battleship sank within two hours. His foot sank in the mud. Her head sinks into the pillows."
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sunk
------------------------
Nevada Class (BB-36 and BB-37), "...Both ships were SUNK in the 7 Dec 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor..."
http://world wide web.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/bb/bb36cl.htm

USS Oklahoma (BB-37), "With her port side torn open over much of its length, Oklahoma rapidly rolled over and SANK to the harbor bottom, with the loss of over 400 of her coiffure..."
http://world wide web.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-o/bb37.htm
------------------------
Pennsylvania Grade (BB-38 and BB-39),
"USS Arizona (BB-39) SUNK and called-for furiously, 7 December 1941..."
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/bb/bb38cl.htm
------------------------
Tennessee Class (BB-43 and BB-44), "USS Tennessee (BB-43), at left, alongside the SUNKEN USS West Virginia (BB-48), photographed from the capsized hull of USS Oklahoma (BB-37) on ten Dec 1941, three days after the Japanese raid..."
http://world wide web.history.navy.mil/photos/usnshtp/bb/bb43cl.htm
------------------------
USS California (BB-44), "Over 2 and a half years afterward she was SUNK, California reentered combat, providing heavy gunfire support for the invasions of Saipan, Guam and Tinian during June and July 1944..."
http://world wide web.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-usn/usnsh-c/bb44.htm
------------------------
I count 5 in the above that are listed as being SUNK, per the Us Navy'due south historical website. And i additional battleship, often disregarded, but still targeted and SUNK, was the USS Utah (BB-31, later AG-16). While it was at the time, a radio-controlled target-send, it HAD started it'south career every bit a battleship. And then, that makes a total of half dozen battleships (5 active, 1 redesignated) that were sunk on December vii, 1941.